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## Afghanistan Situation Report

25X1

12 August 1986

19-81

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Attempts by conservative Arabs of the Wahhabi sect to gain ideological control over Afghan educational programs in Peshawar could weaken the influence of the resistance alliance's education		
foreign policy, including the recent visit of resistance alliance representatives to the US and plans to open overseas offices, are intensifying strains in the fragile alliance.  ARAB INFLUENCE ON AFGHAN EDUCATION PROGRAMS	3	25X 25X
Divisions among Afghan insurgent leaders over	2	25>
on the Kabul-Ghazni road has ended,		25) 25)
INSURGENT ACTIVITY PROMPTS SOVIET-AFGHAN COMBAT  OPERATIONS  A major counterinsurgent operation in Vardak Province to reduce the threat of ambushes to convoys	?	25)

<sup>1</sup> ? August 1986	25 <b>X</b> 1
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This document was prepared by the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis. Ouestions or comments on the issues raised in the publication should be	25X1
	~
the capital.	25X1
forces control of Herat and Qandahardespite intensive counterinsurgent operations in those citiesand guerrilla forces increased attacks in	
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INSURGENT ACTIVITY PROMPTS	S SOVIET-AFGHAN COMBAT OPERATIONS	25>
last week to interdic guerrilla units awav Province, although th eliminated the threat held by the insurgent	-long convov of some 700 vehicles	125X1
		25 <b>X</b> 1
Soviet-Afghan operation underway by 10 August ferried troops southwater the case of the ca	mhassv in Kahul, another large on south of Kabul mav have been . Soviet transport helicopters ard, and a large armored convov cover of darkness. The Embassv orcesapparently responding to ctivity in Lowgar Province in a swath adjacent to the main road event querrilla attacks.	<b>3</b> 25>
Elsewhere, the US Emba overran some of the or defensive perimeter an	assv indicates that the insurgents utposts in the Soviet-Afghan round Oandahar. Guerrilla forces	3
remain in control of t		25>
officials that Gulbuddeleaders who publicly of delegation's visit to establishing resistance and Jeddah-a move fix said that the alliance setup," referring to the setup, and se	der Rabbani recently told US din and Savvaf, the fundamentalist opposed the Rabbani-led the US in June, are also against ce alliance offices in New York ve other leaders favor. Rabbani e "must break out of the present the five-versus-two split in its oned bringing some Hazara Shia	25X
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		25X1
	groups into the alliance. Current alliance spokesman Moiadedi said the plans to form a government-in-exile were running into problems because of the fundamentalists, according to the US Embassv in Islamabad. Gulbuddin was insisting that an election be the sole means of selecting representatives to a resistance council, which would then form a government-in-exile. Other groups favored appointing	
	representatives in areas where an election could not be held.	25X1
	COMMENT: Because alliance decisions are made by consensus rather than by majority vote, Gulbuddin and Savvaf effectively have veto rights over alliance policy. The other political leaders believe Pakistan could bring Gulbuddin and Savvaf in line by threatening to cut off their supplies and almost certainly suspect Islamabad of working against alliance unity. Islamabad probably believes unity, even if attainable, would be undesirable because a united resistance could invite Soviet retaliation, restrict Pakistan's options in the	
	peace talks, and give impetus to Pushtun separatism.	25X1
	If the alliance collapses, insurgent leaders will want US support for any new resistance group they form. A new resistance grouping without Gulbuddin's and Savvaf's participation, however, would have less credibility because these leaders run two of the militarily most effective resistance groups inside	
	Afghanistan.	25X1
ARAB	INFLUENCE ON AFHGAN EDUCATION PROGRAMS	25X1
	Conservative Arabs of the Wahhabi sect are using bribes to try to gain ideological control over Afghan educational programs in Peshawar,	0574
	of the resistance alliance's education committee are paid from 2,000 to 20,000 Pakistani rupees a monthapproximately \$118 to \$1180depending on their	25X1 25X1
	willingness to take orders from the Arabs.  21 of the 42 members of the "ruling council" were handpicked by Wahhabis. The Wahhabis most of whom are from Jordan, Egypt and Syriabush for incorporation of their fundamentalist views in Afghan	25X1 25X1
	textbooks.	25 <b>X</b> 1
	12 August 1996 NESA M 96-20127CX 3 SOVA M 96-20071CX	25X1

	<u> </u>	
	COMMENT: The Wahhabis' interference in these programs undermines the legitimacy of the alliance's education	
	committee and could cause dissension between the	
	committee and individual resistance parties. Even so,	
	many members of the education committee accept the funds but are not committed to the Wahhabi viewpoint.	
	Take the tree to continue to the wantani viewbollite.	
IN	BRIEF	
	- Iran has agreed to allow the International Germittee of	
	Iran has agreed to allow the International Committee of the Red Cross to establish a clinic and guarantine post	
	for Afghan refugees along the Afghan border, according to	
	press reports. The announcement was made on 4 August	
	while the United Nations High Commissioner for Afghan Refugee Affairs was in Tehran. The financial pressures of	
	the war with Iraq have probably forced mehran to	
	reevaluate its position of refusing international aid for	
	the refugees.	
	The private voluntary organization (PVO) Solidarite	
	Afghanistan received \$115,000 from the PVO Americares to	
	establish an Afghan Teacher Training College (TTC) in	
	Quetta, according to the US Consulate in Peshawar.	
	Organizers plan to focus on training elementary school teachers. Classes will be conducted in Farsi rather than	
	Pashto because of the higher concentration of Farsi	
	speakers among Afghan refugees in Baluchistan. No firm	
	date has been set for the opening of the college.	
	Dr. Anahita RatebzadPolitburo member and alleged	
	mistress of Babrak Karmallost her position as president	
	of the Democratic Organization of Afghan Women last week	
	when the organization was renamed the National Council of	
	Afghan Women. Afghan Communist Party leader Naibullah recently announced that comrade Feroza would be the new	
	recomment announces that contrade reford would be the new	
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đ	council head and that luties as chairman of organization.			25 <b>X</b> 1
a p C	Pavel Petrovich Mozha is the new Soviet amb press reports. He is dentral Committee of likely to become a fu	assador to Afghanis now a candidate me the Soviet Communis	stan, according to ember of the	25X1
B S i d s K p	eijing has elaborated oviet leader Gorbach ndicating that it violeserving of serious deptical of Soviet invodo reported that Deptician that the Golitician that that it	d on its initially ev's recent speech ews Gorbachev's proconsideration but denotions. The Jarena Xiaoping told appropriately speech had was "premature" to	in Vladivostok,  pposals as  that it remains  panese news agency  a visiting Japanese  7 "positive  p think that	20/1
	orbachev's speech "c olicv."	Learly reflected h	is toreign	25 <b>X</b> 1
t p a r	esistance forces are the Barikot area, according to the Swiss-the Swiss-the ground targets and edeployed in the ruge	ording to the US Co made guns are used d can be comparation ged terrain around	onsulate in against both air velv rapidly Barikot, where the	
1	nsurgents are besieq	ing an Atghan Armv	outpost.	25 <b>X</b> 1
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PERSPECTIVE	
THE WAR IN JULY	
Combat activity remained at fairly high levels in July, as Soviet and regime forces reacted to a surge in querrilla attacks. Soviet and Afghan forces mounted large counterinsurgent operations east of Kunduz and in the Shevkhabad area. Fighting in Oandahar and Herat was intense at times as Soviet and regime forces tried unsuccessfully to expell the querrillas from their strongholds, and the resistance penetrated Kabul's defenses and stepped up attacks in the capital. A special regime revolutionary tribunal tried in absentia and sentenced to death several prominent insurgent leaders for crimes against the government.	
Large Joint Operations Continue	
The major Soviet-Afghan operation directed against the growing insurgent infrastructure in Takhar Province ended , the operation southeast of	2
Konduz concentrated on reinforcing and resupolving Afghan Government garrisons,	2
The month-long operation probably only temporarily interrupted the Jamiat-i-Islami expansion in the northern province, however. Units of the Soviet-Afghan task force withdrew completely from the operational area upon completion of the sweeps and contact with insurgent forces during the operation was	
relatively limited.	

gunfire. The insurgents launched a two-hour, coordinated rocket and small-arms attack against the Soviet Embassy on 16 July. Resistance rocket attack against Soviet installations at Kheyr Khaneh and Dar of Aman continued in last July, and Embassy sour assert that the insurgents also overran five Soviet Afghan posts in nearby Paghman.  Heavy fighting continued in Herat through most of a soviet motorized rifle divisor.	of  25X1  and eks  roes and 25X1
gunfire. The insurgents launched a two-hour, coordinated rocket and small-arms attack against the Soviet Embassy on 16 July. Resistance rocket attack against Soviet installations at Kheyr Khaneh and Dar ol Aman continued in last July, and Embassy sources assert that the insurgents also overran five Soviet	of 25X1 and e ks rces and
Insurgent activity in the Kabul area increased last month. The US Embassy reported frequent explosions	of
resistance logistics in the area.  Heavy Fighting Continues in Other Urban Areas	of
Some insurgent gro have begun using more camels in an effort to move supplies over more difficult terrain, but this mode transport will add to the time and expense of	ıps
Insurgent supply lines into Oandahar also are increasingly under pressure.	25X′ 25X′
Regime Tries to Tighten Its Grip on Oandahar  Soviet and Afghan forces continued efforts to tight their hold on Qandahar during July. According to tus Embassy in Kabul, there was heavy fighting betwee the resistance and Afghan and Soviet forces in the in mid-month, although the insurgents remained in control of much of the city at month's end. Establishment of new outposts to supplement existing security checkpoints around Qandahar have, however, slowed insurgent infiltration and placed major obstacles in the path of important insurgent supply routes. The US Embassy said that although the querrillas in Qandahar are experiencing shortages of air defense weapons, they have managed so far to sustain operations with available materiel.	ne en citv
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Reflecting Naiibullah' insurgency, the Afghan revolutionary tribunal sentenced to death severand Jalaluddin Haggani months to secure a cearegime may believe this	regime convened that tried in a eral prominent : Ahmad Shah Masod . Kabul has tri se-fire with Mas	d a special absentia and insurgent od, Ismail Khan, ied in vain for sood, and the	
Afghan Army Manpower Poespite tough new draft conscription, the Afghorogress in resolving The US Embassy reports teams have patroled Kadecree to round up all	t laws and increase Army still house the serious mane that armed required bull since the m	eased efforts at as not made much power shortages. ime conscription id-June draft	25X 25X
			25X1 25X1
sources.			25X
Insurgent-initiated acmany other areas. The convovs between 2 July from the Salang area to casualties according to	querrillas amb and 11 July on o the Shomali P	ushed five Soviet the main road lain, inflicting	
Increased Insurgent Ac	tivitv Elsewher	<u>e</u>	
insurgents. After thr extensive damage to th returning to garrison, visited the area.	ee weeks of come city, Soviet	bat that caused units began	25) 25)
and Afghan regime unit	a attempted to		

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	commander to consider seriously a truce and that it will intimidate other commanders into seeking an accommodation with the government.	25 <b>X</b> 1
	Outlook	
	Soviet and Afghan regime efforts to reduce the insurgency in the cities of Herat and Qandahar and to re-exert control in Kabul are likely to remain a high priority. Bolstered security perimeters, which have been a major asset in constraining insurgent activity in Kabul, will be emphasized. Additionally, pressure on resistance supply lines from Pakistan will be maintained. Kabul's attempts to develop significantly larger and more capable armed forces will make little headway, and Afghan regime forces will remain dependent	
	on the Soviets for any major counterinsurgency operation.	25X1
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